This description was written by a machine and published without a person checking it. It is what the agent made of this grouping, and not a statement anybody has stood behind.

Daniel Gruss

A grouping.

Timing side channels against kernel isolation: 'KASLR is Dead: Long Live KASLR' (2017) showed that kernel address-space layout randomisation could be defeated by a timing channel and proposed the separation that later became the deployed mitigation, and Meltdown and Spectre followed in 2018-19. Read in sequence the defence was proposed before the attack that made it necessary was published.

Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution

Paul Kocher and others (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · IEEE

Meltdown

Moritz Lipp and others (2018) · arXiv

Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space

Moritz Lipp and others (2018) · 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18) · USENIX Association

Daniel Gruss

3 references