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A Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker for Equivalence Properties
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Abstract
We consider the problem of computational indistinguishability of protocols. We design a symbolic model, amenable to automated deduction, such that a successful inconsistency proof implies computational indistinguishability. Conversely, symbolic models of distinguishability provide clues for likely computational attacks. We follow the idea we introduced earlier for reachability properties, axiomatizing what an attacker cannot violate. This results a computationally complete symbolic attacker, and ensures unconditional computational soundness for the symbolic analysis. We present a small library of computationally sound, modular axioms, and test our technique on an example protocol. Despite additional difficulties stemming from the equivalence properties, the models and the soundness proofs turn out to be simpler than they were for reachability properties.
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Cite it as
@misc{bana2014computationally,
title = {A Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker for Equivalence Properties},
author = {Gergei Bana and Hubert Comon},
year = {2014},
journal = {ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)},
pages = {609--620},
doi = {10.1145/2660267.2660276},
}