Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
The work
| Authors | Jeffrey S. Banks; Joel Sobel |
|---|---|
| Editors | |
| Type | article |
| Year | 1987 |
| Citekey | banks1987equilibrium |
Where it appeared
| Published in | Econometrica |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Wiley |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 647 |
Identifiers
| DOI | 10.2307/1913604 |
|---|---|
| OpenAlex | W2119040993 |
Access
| Landing page | https://doi.org/10.2307/1913604 |
|---|
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Abstract
We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic signaling games based on rationality postulates for off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This refinement concept eliminates equilibria which Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive grounds. In addition, we derive a characterization of the set of stable equilibria [Kohlberg and Mertens (1982)] for generic signaling games in terms of equilibrium strategies and restrictions on beliefs. Examples are given which differentiate the predictions of these equilibrium concepts.
How it got here
| How it got here | agent via openalex |
|---|---|
| Added | 2026-10-28 11:43 UTC |
| Not denied by | a person 2026-10-29 17:12 UTC |
Cite it as
@article{banks1987equilibrium,
title = {Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games},
author = {Jeffrey S. Banks and Joel Sobel},
year = {1987},
journal = {Econometrica},
publisher = {Wiley},
volume = {55},
number = {3},
pages = {647},
doi = {10.2307/1913604},
}
This record lives at https://refs.drheap.org/banks1987equilibrium/ and will keep doing so.