Triosecuris: Formally Verified Protection Against Speculative Control-Flow Hijacking
The work
| Authors | Jonathan Baumann; Yonghyun Kim; Yan Farba |
|---|---|
| Editors | |
| Type | misc |
| Year | 2026 |
| Citekey | baumann2026triosecuris |
Identifiers
| arXiv | 2601.22978 from its landing_page_url |
|---|
Access
| Landing page | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.22978 |
|---|
Related
| Distinct from | jacobi2005automatic |
|---|---|
| Distinct from | kocher2019spectre |
| Distinct from | lau2026granite |
| Distinct from | melham1990formalizing |
| Distinct from | tan2023security |
From bibtex.
Abstract
This paper introduces Triosecuris, a formally verified defense against Spectre BTB, RSB, and PHT that combines CET-style hardware-assisted control-flow integrity with compiler-inserted speculative load hardening (SLH). Triosecuris is based on the novel observation that in the presence of CET-style protection, we can precisely detect BTB misspeculation for indirect calls and RSB misspeculation for returns and set the SLH misspeculation flag. We formalize Triosecuris as a transformation in Rocq and provide a machine-checked proof that it achieves relative security: any transformed program running with speculation leaks no more than what the source program leaks without speculation. This strong security guarantee applies to arbitrary programs, even those not following the cryptographic constant-time programming discipline.
A copy is held
pdf, 561.4 kB. Not published — it may be under copyright. The facts and links here are.
How it got here
| How it got here | agent via bibtex |
|---|---|
| Added | 2026-09-17 06:25 UTC |
| Approved by | a person 2026-09-17 16:58 UTC |
Filed under
Cite it as
@misc{baumann2026triosecuris,
title = {Triosecuris: Formally Verified Protection Against Speculative Control-Flow Hijacking},
author = {Jonathan Baumann and Yonghyun Kim and Yan Farba},
year = {2026},
}
This record lives at https://refs.drheap.org/baumann2026triosecuris/ and will keep doing so.