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Fault attack vulnerability assessment of binary code

The work

AuthorsJean-Baptiste Bréjon; Karine Heydemann; Emmanuelle Encrenaz; Quentin Meunier; Son Tuan Vu
Editors
Typemisc
Year2019
Citekeybrejon2019fault

Where it appeared

Pages13--18

Identifiers

DOI10.1145/3304080.3304083
OpenAlexW2986250553

From OpenAlex, which stores abstracts as an index of words and their positions: what is shown is rebuilt from that, and reads fluently whether or not it is what the author wrote.

Abstract

Fault attacks are a major threat requiring to protect applications. We present a method and a set of metrics, implemented in a framework combining formal methods, dynamic and static analyses to evaluate the robustness of a binary code against fault attacks. The framework models the vulnerabilities detection as formal equivalence-checking problems that are solved by a SMT solver. It can support transient fault models targeting both data and code. Its application to programs hardened at source level shows its benefits for comparing different hardened versions, compilers and their optimizations, and for analyzing the sources of vulnerability.

How it got here

How it got hereagent via openalex
Added2026-10-26 05:15 UTC
Not denied bya person 2026-10-29 17:12 UTC

Filed under

hardware-security

Cite it as

@misc{brejon2019fault,
  title        = {Fault attack vulnerability assessment of binary code},
  author       = {Jean-Baptiste Bréjon and Karine Heydemann and Emmanuelle Encrenaz and Quentin Meunier and Son Tuan Vu},
  year         = {2019},
  pages        = {13--18},
  doi          = {10.1145/3304080.3304083},
}

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