Timestamps in key distribution protocols
The work
| Authors | Dorothy E. Denning; Giovanni Maria Sacco |
|---|---|
| Type | article |
| Year | 1981 |
| Citekey | denning1981timestamps |
Where it appeared
| Published in | Communications of the ACM |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 533--536 |
Identifiers
| DOI | 10.1145/358722.358740 |
|---|
Access
| Free full text | https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/358722.358740 |
|---|---|
| Landing page | https://doi.org/10.1145/358722.358740 |
Abstract
The distribution of keys in a computer network using single key or public key encryption is discussed. We consider the possibility that communication keys may be compromised, and show that key distribution protocols with timestamps prevent replays of compromised keys. The timestamps have the additional benefit of replacing a two-step handshake.
A copy is held
pdf, 385.9 kB. Not published — it may be under copyright. The facts and links here are.
How it got here
| How it got here | agent via unpaywall |
|---|---|
| Added | 2026-08-08 00:00 UTC |
| Approved by | a person 2026-08-22 10:50 UTC |
Filed under
Cite it as
@article{denning1981timestamps,
title = {Timestamps in key distribution protocols},
author = {Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco},
year = {1981},
journal = {Communications of the ACM},
volume = {24},
number = {8},
pages = {533--536},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
doi = {10.1145/358722.358740},
}
This record lives at https://refs.drheap.org/denning1981timestamps/ and will keep doing so.