Towards a formally verified hardware root-of-trust for data-oblivious computing
The work
| Authors | Lucas Deutschmann; Johannes Müller; Mohammad Rahmani Fadiheh; Dominik Stoffel; Wolfgang Kunz |
|---|---|
| Editors | |
| Type | misc |
| Year | 2022 |
| Citekey | deutschmann2022formally |
Where it appeared
| Published in | Proceedings - ACM IEEE Design Automation Conference |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery |
| Pages | 727--732 |
Identifiers
| DOI | 10.1145/3489517.3530981 |
|---|---|
| OpenAlex | W4293025157 |
Access
| Landing page | https://doi.org/10.1145/3489517.3530981 |
|---|
From OpenAlex, which stores abstracts as an index of words and their positions: what is shown is rebuilt from that, and reads fluently whether or not it is what the author wrote.
Abstract
The importance of preventing microarchitectural timing side channels in security-critical applications has surged immensely over the last several years. Constant-time programming has emerged as a best-practice technique to prevent leaking out secret information through timing. It builds on the assumption that certain basic machine instructions execute timing-independently w.r.t. their input data. However, whether an instruction fulfills this data-independent timing criterion varies strongly from architecture to architecture.
Cite it as
@misc{deutschmann2022formally,
title = {Towards a formally verified hardware root-of-trust for data-oblivious computing},
author = {Lucas Deutschmann and Johannes Müller and Mohammad Rahmani Fadiheh and Dominik Stoffel and Wolfgang Kunz},
year = {2022},
journal = {Proceedings - ACM IEEE Design Automation Conference},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
pages = {727--732},
doi = {10.1145/3489517.3530981},
}
This record lives at https://refs.drheap.org/deutschmann2022formally/ and will keep doing so.