Formal Verification of Correctness and Information Flow Security for an In-Order Pipelined Processor

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Abstract

We present an in-order pipelined processor and its verification in the HOL4 interactive theorem prover.The processor implements the RISC ISA Silver and features a general 5-stage pipeline.The correctness of the processor is proved by exhibiting a refinement relation between the traces of the pipelined circuit and the Silver ISA.The processor is constructed by using a HOL4 Verilog library for formally verified hardware, and its correctness is guaranteed down to the Verilog implementation.Additionally, we analyze the information flow properties of the processor by utilizing the refinement relation.The notion of conditional noninterference formulates that a processor should not leak more information via its timing channel than what is expected by a leakage model expressed at the ISA level.We establish the conditional noninterference for our processor and demonstrate the adaptability of the information flow methodology to accommodate various processor designs, attacker models, and environments.Our approach to verify processor implementations and enable information flow analysis at the circuit level is suitable for ISAs beyond Silver.