Digital routes and borders in the Middle East: the geopolitical underpinnings of Internet connectivity

Abstract

In the second half of the 2010s, the Arabian Peninsula experienced major foreign policy changes that suggested a reshuffling of the region as a security complex. This paper offers an analysis of the geography of Internet data routing in the Middle East in order to assess whether foreign policy shifts apply to cyberspace and the potential for meaningful cybersecurity cooperation. We specifically focus on the Qatar blockade and the Abraham agreements. Our main hypothesis is that the architecture of connectivity can reveal the level of existing cooperation between data-routing operators of different countries and can therefore serve as one among many indicators for the level of trust (or lack thereof) between these countries and, as a result, for the potential success of cyber cooperation. We argue that the architecture of connectivity only partially reflects foreign policy shifts in the Gulf Region and despite the political announcements, digital borders and rivalries in the region remain deep and could potentially create obstacles for meaningful cybersecurity cooperation.