A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware
The work
| Authors | Qian Ge; Yuval Yarom; David Cock; Gernot Heiser |
|---|---|
| Editors | |
| Type | article |
| Year | 2018 |
| Citekey | ge2018survey |
Where it appeared
| Published in | Journal of Cryptographic Engineering |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Springer |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1--27 |
Identifiers
| DOI | 10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6 |
|---|---|
| OpenAlex | W2562036180 |
| ISSN | 2190-8508 |
Access
| Landing page | https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6 |
|---|
Abstract
Microarchitectural timing channels expose hidden hardware states though timing. We survey recent attacks that exploit microarchitectural features in shared hardware, especially as they are relevant for cloud computing. We classify types of attacks according to a taxonomy of the shared resources leveraged for such attacks. Moreover, we take a detailed look at attacks used against shared caches. We survey existing countermeasures. We finally discuss trends in attacks, challenges to combating them, and future directions, especially with respect to hardware support.
A copy is held
pdf, 325.6 kB. Not published — it may be under copyright. The facts and links here are.
How it got here
| How it got here | import via bibtex |
|---|---|
| Added | 2026-08-08 00:00 UTC |
| Approved by | a person 2026-08-08 04:03 UTC |
Cite it as
@article{ge2018survey,
title = {A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware},
author = {Qian Ge and Yuval Yarom and David Cock and Gernot Heiser},
year = {2018},
journal = {Journal of Cryptographic Engineering},
publisher = {Springer},
volume = {8},
number = {1},
pages = {1--27},
issn = {2190-8508},
doi = {10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6},
}
This record lives at https://refs.drheap.org/ge2018survey/ and will keep doing so.