Time Protection: The Missing OS Abstraction
The work
| Authors | Qian Ge; Yuval Yarom; Tom Chothia; Gernot Heiser |
|---|---|
| Editors | |
| Type | inproceedings |
| Year | 2019 |
| Citekey | ge2019time |
Where it appeared
| Published in | Proceedings of the Fourteenth EuroSys Conference |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery |
| Pages | 1--17 |
Identifiers
| DOI | 10.1145/3302424.3303976 |
|---|
Abstract
Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code. Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of the operating system, however, present OSes are unable to prevent timing channels. We argue that OSes must provide time protection, the temporal equivalent of the established memory protection, for isolating security domains. We examine the requirements of time protection, present a design and its implementation in the seL4 microkernel, and evaluate efficacy and cost on x86 and Arm processors.
A copy is held
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How it got here
| How it got here | import via bibtex |
|---|---|
| Added | 2026-08-10 00:00 UTC |
| Approved by | a person 2026-08-18 09:48 UTC |
Filed under
Cite it as
@inproceedings{ge2019time,
title = {Time Protection: The Missing OS Abstraction},
author = {Qian Ge and Yuval Yarom and Tom Chothia and Gernot Heiser},
year = {2019},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fourteenth EuroSys Conference},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
pages = {1--17},
doi = {10.1145/3302424.3303976},
}
This record lives at https://refs.drheap.org/ge2019time/ and will keep doing so.