Using C2 Problem Space to Integrate Cyber and Kinetic Operations

Abstract

Ever since the military used the telegraph in the American Civil War, Command & Control (C2) has taken place through cyberspace. When the USA declared cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare in 2011, this formally recognised that operations can also take place within cyberspace. This recognition brought with it the need to integrate cyber operations with operations in the four physical domains of land, sea, air, and space. However, there are major differences between the domains. Land, sea, air, and space are natural domains containing physical entities located in a continuous, three-dimensional space, while cyberspace is a man-made domain containing inertia-less entities that can move close to the speed of light through a discrete, multi-dimensional space. A physical entity can be in only one location at a time, but cyber entities can be in multiple locations at once. Because physical entities have inertia, their operations, actions, and effects in physical domains are termed kinetic. Despite these differences, cyber entities can only exist within physical entities, typically a computer system or a communications medium. Moreover, cyber entities may also represent physical entities, as when a C2 system represents a tank on the battlefield by data describing the type of tank, its location, and whether it is friendly, hostile, or neutral. Both cyber and kinetic operations can be represented in C2 problem space, in which the characteristics of the operating environment are plotted in multiple dimensions. The five domains occupy different places in this space, complicating their integration in all-domain operations. This paper focuses on the issues involved in integrating offensive operations in cyberspace with kinetic operations, viewed from the perspectives of theory, experience, and doctrine. Relevant theory covers layered conceptualisation of cyberspace, the cyber kill chain, and all-domain operations. Information in the public domain about operational experience is scarce. Case studies from past operations combining cyber and kinetic action suggest that cyber action may be best suited to deception and kinetic action to destruction. A recent paper from practitioners emphasises the important of gaining access to the target. Doctrine will be drawn from US DoD publications in the public domain, covering information operations, cyberspace operations, and targeting. Mapping the findings onto C2 problem space is a step towards finding the appropriate C2 approach(es) for integrated cyber-kinetic operations.