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Abstract
The isolation of security critical components from an untrusted OS allows to both protect applications and to harden the OS itself. Virtualization of the memory subsystem is a key component to provide such isolation. We present the design, implementation and verification of a memory virtualization platform for ARMv7-A processors. The design is based on direct paging, an MMU virtualization mechanism previously introduced by Xen. It is shown that this mechanism can be implemented using a compact design, suitable for formal verification down to a low level of abstraction, without penalizing system performance. The verification is performed using the HOL4 theorem prover and uses a detailed model of the processor. We prove memory isolation along with information flow security for an abstract top-level model of the virtualization mechanism. The abstract model is refined down to a transition system closely resembling a C implementation. Additionally, it is demonstrated how the gap between the low-level abstraction and the binary level-can be filled, using tools that check Hoare contracts. The virtualization mechanism is demonstrated on real hardware via a hypervisor hosting Linux and supporting a tamper-proof run-time monitor that provably prevents code injection in the Linux guest.
@article{guanciale2016provably,
title = {Provably secure memory isolation for Linux on ARM},
author = {Roberto Guanciale and Hamed Nemati and Mads Dam and Christoph Baumann},
year = {2016},
journal = {Journal of Computer Security},
publisher = {IOS Press},
volume = {24},
number = {6},
pages = {793--837},
doi = {10.3233/jcs-160558},
}