Breaking Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization with Intel TSX
The work
| Authors | Yeongjin Jang; Sangho Lee; Taesoo Kim |
|---|---|
| Editors | |
| Type | misc |
| Year | 2016 |
| Citekey | jang2016breaking |
Where it appeared
| Published in | ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) |
|---|---|
| Pages | 380--392 |
Identifiers
| DOI | 10.1145/2976749.2978321 |
|---|---|
| OpenAlex | W2529582363 |
Access
| Landing page | https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978321 |
|---|---|
| Free full text | http://dl.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id=2978321&type=pdf |
From OpenAlex, which stores abstracts as an index of words and their positions: what is shown is rebuilt from that, and reads fluently whether or not it is what the author wrote.
Abstract
Kernel hardening has been an important topic since many applications and security mechanisms often consider the kernel as part of their Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Among various hardening techniques, Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) is the most effective and widely adopted defense mechanism that can practically mitigate various memory corruption vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflow and use-after-free. In principle, KASLR is secure as long as no memory leak vulnerability exists and high entropy is ensured.
How it got here
| How it got here | agent via openalex |
|---|---|
| Added | 2026-10-24 21:21 UTC |
| Not denied by | a person 2026-10-29 17:12 UTC |
Cite it as
@misc{jang2016breaking,
title = {Breaking Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization with Intel TSX},
author = {Yeongjin Jang and Sangho Lee and Taesoo Kim},
year = {2016},
journal = {ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)},
pages = {380--392},
doi = {10.1145/2976749.2978321},
}
This record lives at https://refs.drheap.org/jang2016breaking/ and will keep doing so.