Multics security evaluation: vulnerability analysis

The work

AuthorsPaul A. Karger; Roger R. Schell
Editors
Typeinproceedings
Year2002 first published 1974
Citekeykarger2002multics

Where it appeared

Published in18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2002)
Pages127--146

Related

Distinct fromkarger2002thirty

Abstract

A security evaluation of Multics for potential use as a two-level (Secret/Top Secret) system in the Air Force Data Services Center (AFDSC) is presented. An overview is provided of the present implementation of the Multics Security controls. The report then details the results of a penetration exercise of Multics on the HIS 645 computer. In addition, preliminary results of a penetration exercise of Multics on the new HIS 6180 computer are presented. The report concludes that Multics as implemented today is not certifiably secure and cannot be used in an open use multi-level system. However, the Multics security design principles are significantly better than other contemporary systems. Thus, Multics as implemented today, can be used in a benign Secret/Top Secret environment. In addition, Multics forms a base from which a certifiably secure open use multi-level system can be developed.

A copy is held

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How it got here

How it got hereagent via openalex
Added2026-08-13 00:00 UTC
Approved bya person 2026-09-04 18:17 UTC

Cite it as

@inproceedings{karger2002multics,
  title        = {Multics security evaluation: vulnerability analysis},
  author       = {Paul A. Karger and Roger R. Schell},
  year         = {2002},
  note         = {first published 1974},
  booktitle    = {18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2002)},
  pages        = {127--146},
  doi          = {10.1109/csac.2002.1176286},
}

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