Between Red Buttons and Red Lines: Assessing Mutual Assured Destruction and NATO-Russia Nuclear Dynamics

Abstract

This work examines whether Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) remains a sufficient model of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary strategic environment. Its main objective is to determine the extent to which Cold War assumptions about MAD are sustainable, particularly between Russia and NATO, until the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War. To achieve this, this work is theoretically grounded in structural realism and draws on accounts of nuclear deterrence and its relations to MAD, including its evolution throughout history, and later applies this to investigate Russian-NATO dynamics. This analysis will primarily integrate historical evidence to examine how MAD has been approached from the Cold War to the 21st century, utilizing academic works, government documents, military doctrines, speeches from leaders, and more. Using a mechanism-based causal analysis, the study will trace the evolution of deterrence and examine the conditions under which MAD remains credible. The work concludes that MAD remains relevant but only under specific conditions, serving more as the underlying logic of deterrence rather than an explanation for current nuclear dynamics.