This description was written by a machine and published without a person checking it. It is what the agent made of this grouping, and not a statement anybody has stood behind.

Attacks on interdomain routing

A subject the papers are about. The loosest grouping, and the one to reach for last.

BGP believes what it is told: hijacks, route leaks, the protocol features that allow them and the defences proposed. Operator-caused cases belong here too, since the effect from outside is the same.

49 references

Global BGP Attacks that Evade Route Monitoring
Henry Birge-Lee and others (2025) · International Conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement · Springer
Unexpected Routes: BGP Prefixes Beyond Recommended Practices
Khwaja Zubair Sediqi (2025)
BGP Vortex: Update Message Floods Can Create Internet Instabilities
Felix Stöger and others (2025) · 34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25) · USENIX Association
Byzantine-Secure Relying Party for Resilient RPKI
Jens Frieß and others (2024) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
The CURE to Vulnerabilities in RPKI Validation
Donika Mirdita and others (2024) · Internet Society
Sok: An introspective analysis of rpki security
Donika Mirdita and others (2024) · Available on arXiv
Rpki: Not perfect but good enough
Haya Schulmann and others (2024) · Available on arXiv
RPKI Time-of-Flight: Tracking Delays in the Management, Control, and Data Planes
Romain Fontugne and others (2023) · Springer Nature Switzerland
RoVista: Measuring and Analyzing the Route Origin Validation (ROV) in RPKI
Weitong Li and others (2023) · ACM
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): A Survey on Measurements and Future Prospects
Nils Miro Rodday and others (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
A one-year review of RPKI operations
Massimo Candela (2022) · RIPE 84
Behind the Scenes of RPKI
Tomáš Hlaváček and others (2022) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
Stalloris: RPKI downgrade attack
Tomas Hlavacek and others (2022) · 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security ’22)
NTT’s RPKI Deployment Update
Massimo Candela (2021) · RIPE 82
RPKI Automation and Monitoring
Massimo Candela (2021) · LACNIC 35
Estimating the Impact of BGP Prefix Hijacking
Pavlos Sermpezis and others (2021) · IFIP Networking Conference (IFIP Networking)
Understanding the impact of outsourcing mitigation against BGP prefix hijacking
Man Zeng and others (2021) · Computer Networks · Elsevier BV
Poster: MOAI: Multiple Origin ASes Identification for IP Prefix Hijacking and Mis-Origination
Hironori Imai and others (2020) · NDSS
On Measuring RPKI Relying Parties
John Kristoff and others (2020) · ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC)
To Filter or Not to Filter: Measuring the Benefits of Registering in the RPKI Today
Cecilia Testart and others (2020) · Springer International Publishing
BGP hijacking classification
Shinyoung Cho and others (2019) · IEEE
RPKI is coming of age: A longitudinal study of RPKI deployment and invalid route origins
Taejoong Chung and others (2019) · ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC)
Secure inter-domain routing: Technical and policy considerations
National Institute of Standards and others (2019) · Technical Report Special Publication 800-189 (Draft)
Profiling BGP Serial Hijackers: Capturing Persistent Misbehavior in the Global Routing Table
Cecilia Testart and others (2019) · ACM
China's Maxim – Leave No Access Point Unexploited: The Hidden Story of China Telecom's BGP Hijacking
Chris C. Demchak and others (2018) · Military Cyber Affairs · University of South Florida Libraries
Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and Filtering
Andreas Reuter and others (2018) · ACM
ARTEMIS: Neutralizing BGP Hijacking Within a Minute
Pavlos Sermpezis and others (2018) · IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking · Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
A Survey among Network Operators on BGP Prefix Hijacking
Pavlos Sermpezis and others (2018) · Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)
T. Bruijnzeels and others (2017) · RFC Editor
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1
R. Bush and others (2017) · RFC Editor
Are We There Yet? On RPKI's Deployment and Security
Yossi Gilad and others (2017) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2017)
MaxLength Considered Harmful to the RPKI
Yossi Gilad and others (2017) · ACM
Problem Definition and Classification of BGP Route Leaks
K. Sriram and others (2016) · RFC Editor
BGP Operations and Security
J. Durand and others (2015) · RFC Editor
Rpki miro: Monitoring and inspection of rpki objects
Andreas Reuter and others (2015) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Investigating the Nature of Routing Anomalies: Closing in on Subprefix Hijacking Attacks
Johann Schlamp and others (2015) · Springer International Publishing
Mind Your Blocks: On the Stealthiness of Malicious BGP Hijacks
Pierre-Antoine Vervier and others (2015) · Proceedings 2015 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · Internet Society
Why is it taking so long to secure internet routing?
Sharon Goldberg (2014) · Communications of the ACM · Association for Computing Machinery
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol
R. Bush and others (2013) · RFC Editor
Visual analytics for BGP monitoring and prefix hijacking identification
Ernst Biersack and others (2012) · Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Sizing estimates for a fully deployed rpki
Eric Osterweil and others (2012) · Technical Report 1120005
A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions
K. Butler and others (2010) · Proceedings of the IEEE · Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Losing Control of the Internet: Using the Data Plane to Attack the Control Plane
Max Schuchard and others (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Study of Prefix Hijacking and Interception in the Internet
Hitesh Ballani and others (2007) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
On the characteristics of BGP multiple origin AS conflicts
Kwan-Wu Chin (2007) · IEEE
A Survey of BGP Security
Kevin Butler and others (2005)
Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Ratul Mahajan and others (2002) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
An analysis of BGP multiple origin AS (MOAS) conflicts
Xiaoliang Zhao and others (2001) · ACM Press
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
S. Kent and others (2000) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)