BGP Prefix Origin Validation

The work

AuthorsP. Mohapatra; J. Scudder; D. Ward; R. Bush; R. Austein
Editors
Typemisc
Year2013
Also known asanon2013bgp
Citekeymohapatra2013bgp

Where it appeared

PublisherRFC Editor

Identifiers

DOI10.17487/rfc6811

From unpaywall.

Abstract

To help reduce well-known threats against BGP including prefix misannouncing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one of the security requirements is the ability to validate the origination Autonomous System (AS) of BGP routes. More specifically, one needs to validate that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix (as derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact authorized by the prefix holder to do so. This document describes a simple validation mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement.

A copy is held

pdf, 16.8 kB. Not published — it may be under copyright. The facts and links here are.

How it got here

How it got hereagent via unpaywall
Added2026-09-26 10:12 UTC
Approved bya person 2026-10-22 23:06 UTC

Cite it as

@misc{mohapatra2013bgp,
  title        = {BGP Prefix Origin Validation},
  author       = {P. Mohapatra and J. Scudder and D. Ward and R. Bush and R. Austein},
  year         = {2013},
  publisher    = {RFC Editor},
  doi          = {10.17487/rfc6811},
}

This record lives at https://refs.drheap.org/mohapatra2013bgp/ and will keep doing so. It used to be called anon2013bgp, and those addresses still resolve to this one.