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Abstract
Many fault injection techniques have been proposed in the recent years to attack computing systems, as well as the corresponding countermeasures. Most of published attacks are limited to one or a few faults. We provide a theoretical analysis of instruction skip attacks to show how an attacker can modify an application behavior at run-time when thousands of instruction skips are possible. Our main result is that instruction skip is Turing-complete under our theoretical model while requiring the presence of only common instructions in the binary. As a consequence, we show that current software-based countermeasures are fragile. In addition, we release a modification of gem5 that implements a classical instruction skip fault model that we used for our experiments. We believe this kind of simulation tools are useful to help the community explore attacks and hardware and software countermeasures.
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Cite it as
@misc{peneau2020noporiented,
title = {NOP-Oriented Programming: Should we Care?},
author = {Pierre-Yves Péneau and Ludovic Claudepierre and Damien Hardy and Erven Rohou},
year = {2020},
journal = {IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS\&PW)},
pages = {694--703},
doi = {10.1109/eurospw51379.2020.00100},
}