Strategic Anti-Access/Area Denial in Cyberspace

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Abstract

This paper investigates how anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) operations can be conducted to deny actors access to cyberspace. It examines multiple facets of cyberspace to identify the potential vulnerabilities within the system that could be exploited. This project will also touch upon the policy implications of strategic cyber A2/AD for national security, particularly as they relate to deterrence strategy, coercion, and interstate conflict. The question of deterrence is particularly important. Given the extensive reliance of modern states and societies on cyberspace, the ability to deny access to cyberspace would threaten the economy, security, and stability of a state. A credible threat of this nature may be sufficient to deter armed conflict or compel a more favorable course of action. Thus, strategic A2/AD in cyberspace may create new options and tools for international relations. This paper will address strategic A2/AD with regards to the physical aspects of cyberspace (i.e., cables, satellites). It will assess the strengths and potential vulnerabilities of the physical attributes (the architecture) of cyberspace, as they relate to potential A2/AD operations. It will also address the relevant policy and strategy implications of strategic cyber A2/AD for states, including how this may affects the development of cyber security strategy, critical infrastructure protection, and private sector cooperation. The paper will offer conclusions and recommendations to policymakers and scholars.