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Differential Fault Analysis on PRESENT Key Schedule
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Abstract
PRESENT is a lightweight block cipher designed by A. Bogdanov et al. in 2007 for extremely constrained environments such as RFID tags and sensor networks, where the AES is not suitable for. In this paper, the strength of PRESENT against the differential fault attack on the key schedule is explored. Our attack adopts the nibble oriented model of random faults and assumes that the attacker can induce a single nibble fault on the round key. The attack can efficiently recover the secret key with the computational complexity of 229, and sixty-four pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts on average.
@misc{wang2010differential,
title = {Differential Fault Analysis on PRESENT Key Schedule},
author = {Gaoli Wang and Shaohui Wang},
year = {2010},
journal = {International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS)},
pages = {362--366},
doi = {10.1109/cis.2010.84},
}