C-SAR: SAT Attack Resistant Logic Locking for RSFQ Circuits

From bibtex.

Abstract

Since the development of semiconductor technologies, exascale computing and its associated applications have required increasing degrees of efficiency. Semiconductor-transistor-based circuits (STbCs) have struggled in increasing the GHz frequency. Emerging as an alternative to STbC, the superconducting electrons (SCE) technology promises higher-speed clock frequencies at ultra-low power consumption. The rapid single flux quantum (RSFQ) circuits have a theoretical potential for three orders of magnitude reduction in power while operating at clock frequencies higher than 100 GHz. Although the security in semiconductor technology has been extensively researched and developed, the security design in the superconducting field requires field demands attention. In this paper, C-SAR is presented that aims to protect the superconducting circuit electronics from Boolean satisfiability (SAT) based attacks. The SAT attack is an attack that can break all the existing combinational logic locking techniques. C-SAR can immunize against SAT attacks by increasing the key search space and prolonging the clock cycles of attack inputs. Even in the worst case of C-SAR, in face of S-SAT a specially designed SAT attack, C-SAR can also soar the attack cost exponentially with key bits first, then linearly with the length of camouflaged DFF array. We have shown in this work that the cost of C-SAR is manageable as it only linearly increases as a function of key bits.