Second-Order Recursions of First-Order Cybernetics: An "Experimental Epistemology"

Abstract

This article examines central tensions in cybernetics, defined as the study of self-organization, communication, automated feedback in organisms, and other distributed informational networks, from its wartime beginnings to its contemporary adaptations. By examining aspects of both first- and second-order cybernetics, the article introduces an epistemological standpoint that highlights the tension between its definition as a theory of recursion and a theory of control, prediction, and actionability. I begin by examining the historical outcomes of the Macy Conferences (1946–1954) to provide a context for cybernetics’ initial development for scientific epistemology, ethics, and socio-political thought. I draw extensively from Norbert Wiener, Heinz von Foerster, Ross Ashby, and Gregory Bateson, key figures of this movement. I then elaborate upon certain premises of cybernetics (Ashby’s coupling mechanism, Bateson’s notion of the myth of power) to further elucidate an intellectual history from which to begin to construct a cybernetic epistemology. I conclude by offering the second-order cybernetic concept of recursivity as a model and method for ethico-epistemological questioning that can account for both the constructive potential and the limitations of cybernetics in science and society.