DoW Microelectronics: Application Specific Integrated Circuit Level of Assurance 1 Best Practices

Authors	National Security Agency
Editors
Type	techreport
Year	2026
Citekey	`nsa2026asic`

Published in	National Security Agency
Publisher	National Security Agency
Series	NSA Cybersecurity Technical Report
Number in series	U/OO/6055347-26
Issue	U/OO/6055347-26

Abstract	No abstract is printed on this document, established by reading leaves 1-8 of the copy rather than inferred from its sibling. Like `nsa2024fpga` it carries a "Purpose" section describing NSA's mission and an "Executive Summary", here beginning "This guide identifies threats relevant to DoW Programs that require Level of Assurance 1 (LoA1) protections and the mitigations that are necessary to follow the JFAC HwA Levels of Assurance paradigm." An executive summary is not an abstract and should not be harvested as one; the same decision is recorded on `nsa2024fpga` and, earlier, on `greenarrays2011g144a12`. Worth noting that this summary would be a particularly bad abstract: most of it defines the LoA paradigm and quotes the Defense Acquisition University's hardware-assurance definition, and it points the reader to separate background papers rather than summarising this document's own findings. One detail the copy gives and the record does not: the text reads DoW Programs, not DoD -- the report uses the Department of War naming.

Abstract

No abstract is printed on this document, established by reading leaves 1-8 of the copy rather than inferred from its sibling. Like `nsa2024fpga` it carries a "Purpose" section describing NSA's mission and an "Executive Summary", here beginning "This guide identifies threats relevant to DoW Programs that require Level of Assurance 1 (LoA1) protections and the mitigations that are necessary to follow the JFAC HwA Levels of Assurance paradigm." An executive summary is not an abstract and should not be harvested as one; the same decision is recorded on `nsa2024fpga` and, earlier, on `greenarrays2011g144a12`. Worth noting that this summary would be a particularly bad abstract: most of it defines the LoA paradigm and quotes the Defense Acquisition University's hardware-assurance definition, and it points the reader to separate background papers rather than summarising this document's own findings. One detail the copy gives and the record does not: the text reads **DoW Programs**, not DoD -- the report uses the Department of War naming.

Distinct from	nsa2026threat

pdf, 1.9 MB. Not published — it may be under copyright. The facts and links here are.

How it got here	import via drheap-computer-chips
Added	2026-08-26 00:00 UTC
Approved by	a person 2026-08-26 10:09 UTC

the-chip-you-did-not-fabricate

@techreport{nsa2026asic,
  title        = {DoW Microelectronics: Application Specific Integrated Circuit Level of Assurance 1 Best Practices},
  author       = {National Security Agency},
  year         = {2026},
  journal      = {National Security Agency},
  publisher    = {National Security Agency},
  series       = {NSA Cybersecurity Technical Report},
  number       = {U/OO/6055347-26},
}

This record lives at https://refs.drheap.org/nsa2026asic/ and will keep doing so.

DoW Microelectronics: Application Specific Integrated Circuit Level of Assurance 1 Best Practices

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