Rigorous Engineering for Hardware Security: Formal Modelling and Proof in the CHERI Design and Implementation Process

Where it appeared

Published in2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Pages1003--1020

Related

Distinct frombauereiss2022verified
Distinct fromfuchs2023architectural
Distinct fromguarnieri2020spectector

From bibtex.

Abstract

The root causes of many security vulnerabilities include a pernicious combination of two problems, often regarded as inescapable aspects of computing. First, the protection mechanisms provided by the mainstream processor architecture and C/C++ language abstractions, dating back to the 1970s and before, provide only coarse-grain virtual-memory-based protection. Second, mainstream system engineering relies almost exclusively on test-and-debug methods, with (at best) prose specifications. These methods have historically sufficed commercially for much of the computer industry, but they fail to prevent large numbers of exploitable bugs, and the security problems that this causes are becoming ever more acute. In this paper we show how more rigorous engineering methods can be applied to the development of a new security-enhanced processor architecture, with its accompanying hardware implementation and software stack. We use formal models of the complete instruction-set architecture (ISA) at the heart of the design and engineering process, both in lightweight ways that support and improve normal engineering practice - as documentation, in emulators used as a test oracle for hardware and for running software, and for test generation - and for formal verification. We formalise key intended security properties of the design, and establish that these hold with mechanised proof. This is for the same complete ISA models (complete enough to boot operating systems), without idealisation. We do this for CHERI, an architecture with hardware capabilities that supports fine-grained memory protection and scalable secure compartmentalisation, while offering a smooth adoption path for existing software. CHERI is a maturing research architecture, developed since 2010, with work now underway on an Arm industrial prototype to explore its possible adoption in mass-market commercial processors. The rigorous engineering work described here has been an integral part of its development to date, enabling more rapid and confident experimentation, and boosting confidence in the design.

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Cite it as

@inproceedings{nienhuis2020rigorous,
  title        = {Rigorous Engineering for Hardware Security: Formal Modelling and Proof in the CHERI Design and Implementation Process},
  author       = {Kyndylan Nienhuis and Alexandre Joannou and Thomas Bauereiss and Anthony Fox and Michael Roe and Brian Campbell and Matthew Naylor and Robert M. Norton and Simon W. Moore and Peter G. Neumann and Ian Stark and Robert N. M. Watson and Peter Sewell},
  year         = {2020},
  booktitle    = {2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)},
  pages        = {1003--1020},
  doi          = {10.1109/sp40000.2020.00055},
}

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